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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
A jury convicted David Conner of trafficking in five pounds or more of marijuana. He
appeals from his judgment of conviction and challenges two of the district court’s evidentiary
rulings. Fist, the district court erred by admitting irrelevant and prejudicial evidence that the
Oregon State Police stopped Mr. Conner in Ontario, Oregon shortly before the Idaho State Police
stopped him and discovered marijuana in the trunk of his vehicle.

Second, the district court

erred by admitting irrelevant and prejudicial character evidence that Mr. Conner was driving
without privileges in Oregon, got a citation for doing so, and continued on to Idaho. He asks that
this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
At around 1:30 p.m. on March 5, 2014, Oregon State Police Officer Mills stopped
Mr. Conner on I-84 near Ontario for driving 70 miles per hour in a 65 miles per hour zone.1
(Tr.,2 p.489, L.24–p.491, L.18.) During the stop, Officer Mills came to believe that Mr. Conner
may have had drugs in his car because Mr. Conner was driving a rental from California to
Caldwell during the middle of the week, he only planned to spend a couple of days in Caldwell,
he had energy drinks in the vehicle, and he did not know where the friend he planned to stay with
lived. (Tr., p.498, L.1–p.501, L.6.) While Officer Mills waited to hear back from dispatch, he
called for a drug dog.

(Tr., p.501, Ls.3–6.)

None was available.

(Tr., p.501, Ls.7–11.)

Unbeknownst to Mr. Conner, Officer Mills also called the Idaho State Police to let them know

1

At trial, the court admitted a redacted version of the dash camera video of the Oregon stop as
State’s Exhibit 1.
2
Unless otherwise noted, all citations to the transcript refer to the 961-page transcript titled
“Conner Final,” which contains all but one of the hearings in this case.
1

that Mr. Conner was driving on a suspended license and that Officer Mills suspected Mr. Conner
had drugs in the car. (Tr., p.501, L.7–p.502, L.3.) After learning that Mr. Conner’s California
driver’s license was suspended, Officer Mills wrote him a citation and let him go on his way.
(Tr., p.502, Ls.4–11, p.504, Ls.8–16, p.514, Ls.4–24.)
Mr. Conner continued on toward Caldwell, where ISP Officers Tulleners and Cagle were
waiting for him.3 (Tr., p.547, L.23–p.551, L.8, p.561, L.23–p.569, L.11, p.597, L.8–p.601,
L.12.) As soon as the officers pulled Mr. Conner over, Officer Tulleners asked Mr. Conner
about his suspended license and ran his information through dispatch. (Tr., p.569, L.12–p.571,
L.12.) At about that time, Officer Cullen got to the scene and ran his drug dog along the car.
(Tr., p.571, Ls.13–23, p.582, L.7–p.584, L.1, p.602, Ls.12–17.) The dog allegedly alerted near
the trunk (Tr., p.584, L.2–p.585, L.13), and the officers cuffed Mr. Conner and put him in the
back of a police car. (Tr., p.607, Ls.5–10.) The officers found six bags of what they believed to
be marijuana in the trunk, and then arrested Mr. Conner. (Tr., p.585, L.14–p.588, L.17, p.609,
Ls.1–9; R., pp.17, 24–25.) The State charged him with trafficking in five pounds or more of
marijuana, I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(1), in Canyon County Case No. Cr-2014-5026 (R., pp.24–25), and
for driving without privileges, I.C. § 18-8001(3), in Canyon County Case No. Cr-2014-5036
(R., p.7). The files were consolidated on March 5, 2014. (R., pp.26–27.)
At the beginning of the first day of trial, while the parties discussed last-minute matters
with the court, defense counsel said:
Judge, we just—and we appreciate the advanced notice that the State
would not be proceeding on the DWP.4 So I’m just trying to save everybody’s
3

At trial, the court admitted a redacted version of the dash camera video of the Idaho stop as
State’s Exhibit 2.
4
It is unclear when the prosecutor told defense counsel that he did not plan on prosecuting the
driving without privileges charge, but it appears from the record that it may have happened after
the status conference the day before trial, or possibly the day of trial. (Compare R., p.196
2

time and the jury’s time. I don’t see how any of the Oregon stuff is relevant if the
State isn’t proceeding on the DWP. And it’s my understanding of the intent to
call an Oregon officer and play a long video from Oregon. And I don’t see how
that’s relevant ‘cause the Court’s already ruled on the 12(b) issues. So the stuff
that happened in Oregon is of no consequence.
(Tr., p.192, Ls.9–20 (footnote added).)
In addition to relevance, defense counsel explained:
[A]nything about the DWP is not relevant. And it’s even—it could be even be
construed as 404(b) evidence. . . .
And Judge, it’s just not relevant. Any mention of DWP just, essentially,
says that this guy’s a criminal. And if the State wanted to proceed on the DWP,
they could have, but they chose not to.
(Tr., p.194, L.12–p.195, L.9.)
The prosecutor responded:
Your Honor, there’s certain factual things from the contact by Ryan Mills
of the Oregon State Police with the defendant, certain things we learned from the
defendant that the State plans on introducing in this trial. The State is entitled to
present the context of its case, including those events which bring about the case,
basically, that give some meaning and reasoning to what law enforcement is
doing. So besides the contextual argument, there’s [sic] also factual issues of
statements made by the defendant that we plan on bringing in through the video of
the testimony of Officer Mills.
And we plan on talking about that the dispatch informed him his license
was suspended out of California. That was some of the information passed on to
Idaho State Police. This Court ruled in the motion to suppress hearing that
information is appropriate. You can rely on dispatch. Proving DWP in trial’s a
whole other thing. Under Idaho law, DWP has certain requirements and
elements, matters of notice. We’re not going to get mixed up in that with the jury,
but they should be allowed, under the law, to hear the basis for what this—you
know, for the ticket that he received and him being stopped in Idaho, and also to
hear his statements to the Oregon State Police Officer Ryan Mills.
Now, you know, I don’t—I wouldn’t like to give away all my argument in
the case and all my facts, but we find that some of those facts are relevant.

(January 20 status conference minutes listing both case numbers) and 1/20/15 Tr. with R., p.203
(January 21 jury trial minutes listing only the trafficking case number) and 1/21/15 Tr.) The
prosecutor did not actually dismiss the driving without privileges charge until March 16, 2015.
(R., p.8.)

3

(Tr., p.193, L.4–p.194, L.10.)
The court decided it would admit evidence of the Oregon stop and Mr. Conner driving
without privileges:
With regard to the video, to give the attorneys a heads-up, I have not seen
the redacted video. And I have been trying to recall, based upon the motion to
suppress, my review of the video. At this point I am inclined to allow the State to
put on their evidence regarding the Oregon stop, again, with the same concerns
that I think, at least arguably, the Defense makes some points, which the Court
should pay attention to, you know, where the State’s dismissing the DWP, how
relevant is it. But the Court is aware that there’s other evidence and information
elicited in the discussion with the defendant during the Oregon stop that may
relate to the, quote, whole story. And that’s the basis of the Court’s decision.
However, the Court will be reviewing rules authority cited by both sides
and reserves a right to readdress the issue before we start the case after we’ve
selected a jury.
(Tr., p.205, L.8–p.206, L.2.)
Later on in the day, defense counsel renewed his objections, arguing that evidence of the
Oregon stop and evidence that he drove without privileges was not relevant, was highly
prejudicial under Rule 403, and was impermissible Rule 404(b) character evidence.
Judge, we would, once again, argue that nothing on the video is
relevant. . . . And it is prejudicial. The defendant was suspended out of
California. And when the State was proceeding on the DWP, then it may have
been relevant. But they’re no longer proceeding on the DWP . . . .
And the—and Judge, this is a trafficking charge, not an intent to deliver.
So the officer’s questions about where he’s going, what street it’s on, how long
he’s going to be there, none of it’s relevant. It’s all prejudicial. And if this was
intent to deliver, it would be different. But trafficking is just simple possession of
X amount of a controlled substance. And questions about luggage, clothes, where
he was going, the rental car . . . under the balancing of 403, none of this should
come in because they’re not proceeding on the DWP.
(Tr., p.364, L.18–p.365, L.23; see also Tr., p.334, Ls.3–4.)
When the court asked what the prosecutor thought of Mr. Conner’s Rule 404(b)
objection, the prosecutor responded:

4

First of all, as argued earlier, it’s contextual. That’s really part of the reason, the
basis for the stop in Idaho. The information’s passed on. It’s going to be coming
from Oregon. The officer sends him on.
....
Again, I think it’s—it still comes in as contextual, Your Honor. We would
argue that it should be allowed in. It’s part of the—I don’t know what you will—
the veins of what’s going on here, part of the being of this investigation.
....
Some of this stuff, the statements made by the defendant are for the
substance to address the criminal charge at hand. . . . [T]he information about
where he’s going—this is a rental car, [no one asked him to take anything with
him, and he’s got luggage in the trunk is c]ompletely relevant because it ties him
. . . as the only person in charge of using this vehicle and to the stuff in that
vehicle.
(Tr., p.368, L.21–p.371, L.20.)
The court again concluded it would admit the evidence:
In this case, whether or not the defendant . . . was suspended or was charged with
driving without privileges really was not evidence of propensity to commit a
trafficking offense, but provides a context to the story of the stop and the
communication to Idaho law enforcement. The two attorneys have already
stipulated the Idaho video into evidence, which includes reference to the fact that
the defendant was being stopped for driving without privileges based upon the
information Idaho received.
(Tr., p.374, L.16–p.375, L.2.) The court continued:
This proceeding involves a sort of continuing course of activity that involved the
State of Oregon, law enforcement in Oregon making a legitimate stop on a
defendant, citing him for not having a valid driver’s license in Oregon and
reporting that to law enforcement in Idaho who, using that evidence, makes a
stop. And I’ve already made a ruling on that.
And so it provides context to the story. Given the fact that the Court has
already ruled that there was probable cause for the stop on both ends, the—and
that the Idaho video recites the information that they—the Idaho officers had from
Oregon, including that the defendant was suspended, I don’t find that—I find that
it’s relevant to the extent it provides context and explanation for the stops, the
story. It’s—any prejudice does not outweigh any probative value. . . .
....
If the defendant—if the evidence was that the defendant was charged with
trafficking in Malheur County the week before, that would be a propensity 404(b),
prior bad act. The fact that he got stopped for DWP, was told he was suspended
and then subsequently stopped and cited in Idaho, to me, is not propensity

5

evidence in the trafficking. And it provides context to the entire story of this
prosecution and this charge. . . .
(Tr., p.377, L.6–p.378, L.23.)
The version of the Oregon video introduced at trial is about half of the length of the
original 23-minute video. (Compare State’s Ex. 1 to 1/22/15 jury trial with State’s Ex. 1 to
Motion Hearing to Amend Information.5) It shows Officer Mills stopping Mr. Conner’s car,
asking for his license and registration, and then asking Mr. Conner questions about his trip.
(1/22/15 State’s Ex. 1, at 1:45–5:30.) During the conversation, Mr. Conner said that he was
driving a rental car from the Redding area in California to visit a friend in Caldwell where he
would stay for a few days. (Id. at 2:40–5:30.) When asked where he was staying in Caldwell,
Mr. Conner said he would stay at his friend’s house, but he did not remember the address and
could not describe where it was. (Id. at 5:15–6:00.)
Officer Mills took Mr. Conner’s information back to his patrol car to send it to dispatch,
then asked to talk to Mr. Conner outside of his car. (Id. at 7:30–8:30.) Officer Mills asked if
there were any drugs or large amounts of cash in the car, or if anyone had asked him to take
anything to Caldwell for them, which Mr. Conner denied. (Id. at 8:25–9:15.) Mr. Conner said
he did have luggage in the trunk of the car. (Id. at 8:30–8:40.) Officer Mills said “you’re just
making a one-day trip to your friend’s house,” to which Mr. Conner responded that he was going
for a few days and explained his travel plans. (Id. at 8:40–8:48.) Officer Mills then said he’d be
calling a drug dog, and asked Mr. Conner if the dog would alert on his car. (Id. at 9:00–9:25.)
Mr. Conner said he would not. (Id. at 9:15–30.) The video then jumped ahead to Officer Mills

5

It appears this exhibit has been mislabeled. The State did not introduce an exhibit at the
hearing on the motion to amend the information (see 1/20/15 Tr.), but did introduce a video of
the Oregon stop at the hearing on the motion to suppress (Tr., p.15, Ls.10–11, p.87, L.24–p.88,
L.15).
6

telling Mr. Conner that he could not get a drug dog, citing Mr. Conner for driving on a
suspended license out of California, and then returning to his patrol car. (Id. 10:00–10:56.)
Officer Miller testified consistently with the video of the Oregon stop, and also told the
jury why he suspected Mr. Conner was involved in criminal activity:
My suspicion was based on several initial things at the initial contact . . .
One, it was a rental vehicle. I’ve rented vehicles myself. But I do know from
training and experience that rental vehicles are often used to commit criminal
activity because it separates that person from their car, as far as not being the
ownership [sic] of the car.
I noticed it was in the middle of the week that he rented. It was a very,
very short trip. Those are very common when it—it’s particular to the
transportation of drugs because people rent a car just for enough time to get where
they’re needed to go and get right back home. And in this case, when I looked at
the rental paperwork, Mr. Conner rented the vehicle the 4th. I had stopped him
the 5th. And it was due back, I believe, at noon on the 8th in Anderson,
California.
I asked him where he was going. He told me Caldwell. So that means he
was only going to rent a vehicle and stay in Caldwell at that time for a day and a
half, maybe, in the middle of a work week. So take almost 40 hours of work off
to stay a day and a half in Caldwell. I asked him what he was doing. He told me
he was visiting a friend. And told me—that used to live in Anderson. So I said,
“Well, where does your friend live?” He kind of hesitated. He asked me a couple
of repetitive questions back, which is, from my training and experience, someone
trying to come up with an answer. . . .
....
. . . I asked him where he was headed to visit his friend. And the best answer he
could give me was something boulevard. I also know from my training and
experience that oftentimes people that are involved in criminal activity,
specifically transportation of drugs, don’t always know exactly where they’re
headed. And they contact the person once they get to their destination, and that's
when they’re given an address.
So based on those—and the other thing that I noticed was a—a crushed
energy drink on the floorboard. The only thing that was visible in the car was a
cooler. I asked him if he had any alcohol in the car. He opened it up, showed it
to me. And there was additional energy drinks in there, along with water. That’s
also something I’m looking for. When someone’s heading to a location, they
commonly have energy drinks in the car because they want to get to that
destination as quickly as possible, and they want to stay alert.
So the combination of all those things made me think that potentially the
driver was involved in criminal activity and that’s why I asked for a drug K9 to
further my investigation.

7

(Tr., p.498, L.1–p.501, L.6.)
The jury found Mr. Conner guilty of trafficking more than five pounds of marijuana.
(Tr., p.926, L.7–p.927, L.22; R., p.309.) The court sentenced him to seven years, with three
years fixed (R., pp.325–26), and Mr. Conner timely appealed (R., pp.327–28).

8

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err by admitting evidence of the Oregon stop because it is irrelevant
and unfairly prejudicial, and can the State show that error is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt?

II.

Did the district court err by admitting evidence that Mr. Conner drove without privileges
because it is irrelevant and prejudicial character evidence, and can the State show that
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt?

9

ARGUMENT
This Court applies a mixed standard of review to questions of admissibility. State v.
Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 907 (2015). It reviews whether evidence is relevant de novo, while it
reviews whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect for an abuse
of discretion. Id. The abuse of discretion standard considers: “(1) whether the court correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries
of its discretion and consistently within the applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Id. If an error is followed by a contemporaneous
objection and the appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden of
proving, “‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the
verdict

obtained.’”

Id.

at

911

(quoting

State

v.

Perry, 150

Idaho

209,

221

(2010) and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
I.
Evidence Of The Oregon Stop Is Irrelevant And Unfairly Prejudicial, And The State Cannot
Show That The District Court’s Erroneous Admission Of That Evidence Is Harmless
Over defense counsel’s objection on the grounds of relevance and prejudice, the district
court erroneously admitted evidence of the Oregon stop. Because the State cannot show that the
guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to that error, the error
requires remand.
A.

The District Court Erred By Admitting Evidence Of The Oregon Stop Because It Is
Irrelevant And Unfairly Prejudicial
“Relevant Evidence” means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any

fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than

10

it would be without the evidence. I.R.E. 401. Only relevant evidence is admissible. I.R.E. 402.
In addition, even relevant “evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” I.R.E. 403. “Evidence is not unfairly prejudicial
simply because it is damaging to a defendant’s case. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it
suggests decision on an improper basis.” State v. Fordyce, 151 Idaho 868, 870 (Ct. App. 2011).
The district court erroneously admitted evidence of the Oregon stop. First, evidence of
the Oregon stop—including the Oregon video and Officer Mills’ testimony6—was not relevant to
any fact of consequence in this case. The State charged Mr. Conner with trafficking more than
five pounds of marijuana (R., pp.201–02), which required the State to prove that:
1.
2.
3
4.
5.

On or about March 5, 2014;
In the state of Idaho;
Mr. Conner possessed and/or brought into the state marijuana;
He knew it was marijuana; and
He possessed five pounds or more of marijuana.

(See R., p.294.) The video of the Oregon stop and Officer Mills’ testimony have no bearing on
the elements of the crime charged. As explained by defense counsel, “this is a trafficking
charge, not an intent to deliver. So the officer’s questions about where he’s going, what street
it’s on, how long he’s going to be there, none of it’s relevant.” (Tr., p.365, Ls.11–15.) The
district court’s own reasoning supports this conclusion. It did not conclude that the evidence was
relevant to prove the crime charged, but rather allowed the evidence in as background
information. (Tr., p.205, Ls.19–22 (explaining that “there’s other evidence and information
elicited in the discussion with the defendant during the Oregon stop that may relate to the, quote,
whole story”), p.377, Ls.6–14 (“This proceeding involves a sort of continuing course of activity

6

Although evidence that Mr. Conner was driving without privileges came about during the
Oregon stop, Mr. Conner challenges that evidence separately.

11

that involved the State of Oregon, law enforcement in Oregon making a legitimate stop on a
defendant, citing him for not having a valid driver’s license in Oregon and reporting that to law
enforcement in Idaho who, using that evidence, makes a stop. . . . And so it provides context to
the story.”).) Because the evidence does not tend to prove or disprove any fact of consequence,
it is not relevant and thus inadmissible under Rules 401 and 402.
Second, evidence of the Oregon stop unfairly prejudiced Mr. Conner because it made him
out to be a dishonest and suspicious person who does not respect the law. The video showed
Officer Mills pulling Mr. Conner over for speeding and asking him various questions about what
he was doing, where he was going, and whether he was involved in anything illegal.
(See generally 1/22/15 State’s Ex. 1.) In response to those questions, Mr. Conner said that he
had no drugs in the car and that a drug dog would not alert on the car. (See generally id.) In
addition, Officer Mills testified that he suspected Mr. Conner was involved in criminal activity
because he was going on a short trip, drove a rental car, had energy drinks, and did not know the
address where he was going to stay that night. (Tr., p.498, L.1–p.501, L.6.) This evidence
tended to show that Mr. Conner is a dishonest and suspicious person who disrespects the law,
and thus suggests a decision on an improper basis. See Fordyce, 151 Idaho at 870. Because the
Oregon stop is not relevant to the trafficking charge and unfairly prejudiced Mr. Conner, the
district court erred by admitting that evidence.
B.

The State Cannot Show That Mr. Conner’s Guilty Verdict Was Surely Unattributable To
Evidence Of The Oregon Stop
When a defendant objects to an error and shows that a violation occurred, the State bears

the burden of proving, “‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained.’”

Perry, 150 Idaho at 221 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at
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24). Under Chapman, an error is harmless if the government can prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the error did not contribute to the jury’s verdict. Id. “[T]he issue under Chapman is
whether the jury actually rested its verdict on evidence establishing the presumed fact beyond a
reasonable doubt, independently of” the inadmissible evidence. Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391,
404 (1991). “The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the
error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually
rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S.
275, 279 (1993) (emphasis added).
Here, the State cannot show that Mr. Conner’s guilty verdict was surely unattributable to
evidence of the Oregon stop. See id. Therefore, this Court should vacate Mr. Conner’s judgment
of conviction and remand to the district court.
II.
Evidence That Mr. Conner Was Driving Without Privileges Is Irrelevant And Prejudicial
Character Evidence, And The State Cannot Show That District Court’s Erroneous Admission Of
That Evidence Is Harmless
The district court erroneously admitted evidence that Mr. Conner drove on a suspended
license over defense counsel’s objection that such evidence is irrelevant and prejudicial character
evidence. Because the State cannot show that the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial
was surely unattributable to that error, the error requires remand.
A.

The Court Erred By Admitting Evidence That Mr. Conner Was Driving Without
Privileges Because It Is Irrelevant And Prejudicial Character Evidence
Under Rule 404(b), “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to

prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.”
“It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
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preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”

I.R.E. 404(b).

Therefore, “‘evidence of a person’s actions or conduct, other than that set forth as an ultimate
issue for trial, is generally inadmissible.’” State v. Medrano, 123 Idaho 114, 119 (Ct. App.
1992) (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 948, 950 (Ct. App. 1990)) (emphasis added).
Under Rule 403, even relevant evidence may be excluded if the danger of unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs its probative value.
To decide whether the district court properly admitted Rule 404(b) evidence, this Court
first determines if there is sufficient evidence to establish the other crime or wrong as fact.7
State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009). Next, it asks whether, under Rule 404(b), the evidence is
relevant as a matter of law to an issue other than the defendant’s character or criminal
propensity. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667 (2010). Finally, it asks whether, under Rule
403, the district court abused its discretion by finding that the danger of unfair prejudice to the
defendant did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence. Id. at 667.
In this case, the court abused its discretion by initially deciding to admit the evidence
without addressing the Rule 404(b) argument at all. When deciding whether to admit the
evidence on the morning of the first day of trial, the court simply stated:
At this point I am inclined to allow the State to put on their evidence
regarding the Oregon stop, again, with the same concerns that I think, at least
arguably, the Defense makes some points, which the Court should pay attention
to, you know, where the State’s dismissing the DWP, how relevant is it. But the
Court is aware that there’s other evidence and information elicited in the
discussion with the defendant during the Oregon stop that may relate to the,
quote, whole story. And that’s the basis of the Court’s decision.
However, the Court will be reviewing rules and authority cited by both
sides and reserves a right to readdress the issue before we start the case after
we’ve selected a jury.

7

Mr. Conner does not contend that there is insufficient evidence to establish that he was driving
without privileges.
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(Tr., p.205, L.12–p.206, L.2.) Because the court did not conduct the requisite analysis—deciding
whether the evidence was relevant to an issue other than Mr. Conner’s character and then
whether the prejudice caused by that evidence outweighed its probative value—it abused its
discretion. See State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 139 (2014) (“By failing to conduct the Rule 403
balancing test, the district court did not act consistently within the applicable legal standards,”
and thus abused its discretion).
When addressing defense counsel’s renewed objections later in the day, the court
mistakenly concluded that this evidence was not character evidence in the first place because it
was not the same type of conduct as the charged conduct. (Tr., p.374, Ls.17–20 (“whether or not
the defendant . . . was suspended or was charged with driving without privileges really was not
evidence of propensity to commit a trafficking offense.”), p.376, Ls.15–22 (“if the evidence was
that the defendant was charged with trafficking in Malheur County the week before, that would
be a propensity 404(b), prior bad act. The fact that he got stopped for DWP, was told he was
suspended and then subsequently stopped and cited in Idaho, to me, is not propensity evidence in
the trafficking.”)8.) To the contrary, the plain language of Rule 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show that the person acted in conformity therewith.” Rule 404(b) does not require that the prior
act and alleged crime be identical or even similar. Rather, the rule applies to any evidence that
tends to prove the defendant’s bad character. See id. That Mr. Conner was driving on a
suspended license in Oregon, was cited for doing so, and then continued driving on to Idaho,

8

The court also noted that “[t]he two attorneys have already stipulated the Idaho video into
evidence, which includes reference to the fact that the defendant was being stopped for driving
without privileges based upon the information Idaho received.” (Tr., p.374, L.22–p.375, L.2.)
That’s true. (See Tr., p.351, L.25–p.355, L.4.) But that stipulation only came after the court said
it would admit the evidence (Tr., p.205, L.8–p.206, L.2), and thus has no bearing on this issue.
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does just that. It shows Mr. Conner does not believe the rules apply to him and has no respect
for law enforcement. Therefore, evidence that Mr. Conner was driving without privileges is
character evidence according to the plain definition in Rule 404(b).
Next, evidence that Mr. Conner drove without privileges is not relevant to any issue other
than Mr. Conner’s character. The evidence, by the State and the Court’s own acknowledgement,
only provided context to the stop. (Tr., p.194, Ls.2–6 (the State explaining that the jury “should
be allowed, under the law, to hear the basis for what this—you know, for the ticket that he
received and him being stopped in Idaho, and also to hear his statements to the Oregon State
Police Officer Ryan Mills.”), p.368, Ls.21–24 (the State reiterating that, “as argued earlier, it’s
contextual. That’s really part of the reason, the basis for the stop in Idaho.”), p.205, Ls.21–22
(the court acknowledging that it goes to the “whole story”).) Why Mr. Conner was stopped in
Idaho, and much less that he was stopped at all in Oregon, has no bearing on whether he was
trafficking marijuana and is therefore not relevant to an ultimate issue for trial.
Finally, the prejudice to Mr. Conner substantially outweighed the negligible probative
value of the evidence. As discussed above, evidence that Mr. Conner drove without privileges in
Oregon, got a ticket, and continued driving on to Idaho shows that Mr. Conner does not believe
the rules apply to him and has no respect for law enforcement. This prejudice substantially
outweighs the “probative” value of the evidence, which was only to provide the jury with
background information that is wholly irrelevant to the ultimate issues for trial. Therefore, the
court erred by admitting evidence that Mr. Conner drove without privileges.
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B.

The State Cannot Show That Mr. Conner’s Guilty Verdict Was Surely Unattributable To
The Evidence That Mr. Conner Drove Without Privileges
As discussed above (see supra, pp.12–13), when a defendant objects to a trial error and

shows on appeal that a violation occurred, the State has the burden of proving “‘beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’”
Perry, 150 Idaho at 221 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).

The State cannot show that

Mr. Conner’s guilty verdict was surely unattributable to the evidence that he drove without
privileges. See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Conner respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and
remand to the district court for a new trial.
DATED this 24th day of March, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
MAYA P. WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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